American Airpower Strategy In Korea 1950-1953

[Epub] American Airpower Strategy In Korea 1950-1953 By Conrad C. Crane – Lovelylingeriecompany.co.uk
  • Hardcover
  • 262 pages
  • American Airpower Strategy In Korea 1950-1953
  • Conrad C. Crane
  • English
  • 06 May 2017
  • 9780700609918

About the Author: Conrad C. Crane

Conrad C Crane is chief historical services, US Army Heritage and Education Center, US Army War College.


American Airpower Strategy In Korea 1950-1953The Korean War Was The First Armed Engagement For The Newly Formed U.S Air Force, But Far From The Type Of Conflict It Expected Or Wanted To Fight As The First Air War Of The Nuclear Age, It Posed A Major Challenge To The Service To Define And Successfully Carry Out Its Mission By Stretching The Constraints Of Limited War While Avoiding The Excesses Of Total War Conrad Crane Analyzes Both The Successes And Failures Of The Air Force In Korea, Offering A Balanced Treatment Of How The Air War In Korea Actually Unfolded He Examines The Air Force S Contention That It Could Play A Decisive Role In A Non Nuclear Regional War But Shows That The Fledgling Service Was Held To Unrealistically High Expectations Based On Airpower S Performance In World War II, Despite Being Constrained By The Limited Nature Of The Korean Conflict.Crane Exposes The Tensions And Rivalries Between Services, Showing That Emphasis On Strategic Bombing Came At The Expense Of Air Support For Ground Troops, And He Tells How Interactions Between Army And Air Force Generals Shaped The Air Force S Mission And Strategy He Also Addresses Misunderstandings About Plans To Use Nuclear, Biological, And Chemical Weapons In The War And Includes New Information From Pilot Correspondence About The Informal Policy Of Hot Pursuit Over The Yalu That Existed At The End Of The War The Book Considers Not Only The Actual Air Effort In Korea But Also Its Ramifications The Air Force Doubled In Size During The War And Used That Growth To Secure Its Position In The Defense Establishment, But It Wagered Its Future On Its Ability To Deliver Nuclear Weapons In A High Intensity Conflict A Position That Left It Unprepared To Fight The Next Limited War In Vietnam.As America Observes The Fiftieth Anniversary Of Its Initial Engagement In Korea, Crane S Book Is An Important Reminder Of The Lessons Learned There And As Airpower Continues To Be A Cornerstone Of American Defense, This Examination Of Its Uses In Korea Provides New Insights About The Air Force S Capabilities And Limitations.

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10 thoughts on “American Airpower Strategy In Korea 1950-1953

  1. Vheissu says:

    This is a scholarly work not intended for general readers It will interest military historians, obviously those interested in air combat in the Korean War, but it will also interest students of bureaucratic politics For those interested in the evolution of U.S strategic warfare and nuclear weapons, it is indispensable.The record of U.S Air Force operations in Korea is mixed At first, political leaders and some military leaders, mostly Army and especially Douglas MacArthur, had inflated expectations of Air Force power Air Force leaders, principally Curtis LeMay and Otto Weyland, were much cautious Once the Air Force failed to live up to exaggerated expectations, those same enthusiasts rebuked the Air Force both publicly and privately for shirking its duty, while the Air Force was compelled to explain to politicians and the public that its efforts were mostly successful, and toward the end of the war, possibly decisive.Korea was not LeMay s idea of war The Air Force s primary mission was aimed at general strategic war with the Soviets and their allies, and not really deterrence, and certainly not close ground support or interdiction Its force structure, training, and planning were narrowly focused on the annihilation of the USSR, Communist China, and their satellite states Consequently, the Air Force had no real assets for a war like Korea, especially giv...

  2. Jonathan Z. says:

    A good look at the limitations, problems, and expectations placed on the USAF immediately after WWII.

  3. Ross Mallett says:

    Excellent account Very comprehensive.

  4. Scottnshana says:

    I am fascinated by the Korean War We have an airport in my hometown named after one of its aces I like to think the Wichita East High School Aces were also named in his honor when he came home Colonel James Jabara and a beautiful war monument to those we lost in Korea perched next to the Arkansas River in Veterans Memorial Park So when my alma mater published this superb book back in 2000, I figured I should get a copy In it, Crane doesn t just list US airframes on the various bases in Far East Air Forces or push out stats on bombs dropped per month he puts the reader inside the context of 1950, when Japan was in the throes of reconstruction, we now had an air delivered weapon that could kill cities, and most of the world certainly not China or Russia, though had drastically drawn its forces down in the wake of World War II Stalin was still in the Kremlin, Truman was still in the White House, and the US was taking on huge international responsibilities as the British and French empires faded From there, Crane takes the gloss off the history and does the deep dive into some problems America...

  5. Raj Agrawal says:

    Difficulty fitting airpower as a concept, culture, and capability into the context of a limited war see Clodfelter Initial belief that airpower could win the war was based on preconceptions developed from strategic airpower s devastating effects during WWII, but subsequent disillusion from reality this book has a similar theme as Biddle s rhetoric vs reality during the Korean War caused American leaders to question the efficacy of airpower as a whole The same destructive power that makes airpower an effective deterrent by intimidating potential aggressors, or an effective military tool by punishing them for transgressions, can also make its use unpalatable to nations suspicious of American power or sensitive to civilian suffering 184 Ultimately, the wrong lesson was learned that strategic bombing is a panacea key airpower leader was SAC commander, Lt Gen LeMay It general, the Air Force took away that a punishment strategy see Pape using airpower was effective in Korea Even emphatically, the Air Force came out of Korea believing that superior performance is the first and essential requirement of aircraft in...

  6. Mike Hankins says:

    Its difficult to understand exactly why this book was written, or what I would use it for Crane argues that airpower promises of quick and decisive victory were not achieved in Korea, and confused air war planners He elaborates that the various lessons learned namely, the importance of tactical airpower and the failure of strategic bombing in a limited war context were ignored and had to be relearned at great cost in the VIetnam War He is not wrong in these conclusions, but they do not seem to differ from other literature on the subject In essence, this book works well as a brief summary of Robert Futrell s lengthy study of the Air Force in the Korean War, yet does not seem to offer anything unique.Crane does explore a few isolated areas of interest The degree to which nuclear options were considered is intriguing and revealing, as is the study of the U.S s willingness to use chemical and biological weapons Perhaps most fascinating is the study of psychological problems affecting pilots, specifically fear of flying syndrome and its various causes These areas are interesting and add value to Crane s work, yet they are somewhat unfocused, and he fails to directly link these aspects to this central themes Overall the work is simply scattered and would benefit from stronger organization Crane also refrains from exploring the personalities of the various leaders he discusses The many characters he discusses blu...

  7. Trav says:

    This is the first book that I have read that truly highlights the influence of the personality and experience of individual leaders on the development and employment of air power Conrad s focus on the influence of individuals on the Korean air war is evident from the opening pages of the book when he lays out the how the view of air power of the various CINCFEs were shaped by their WWII experience That a leader s experience shapes the employment of assets at his disposal is not a surprising revelation however, as Conrad makes clear, this impact is pronounced when there is an absence of sound strategy or doctrine to refine these views US air power in Korea was effective and was decisive in bringing about an armistice However, with no clear strategy guiding the air campaign from the outset, there was no real concept that was getting tested and proven over the...

  8. Barry Hunte says:

    Good if you like fighter pilot books Very biased.